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Abstract
This paper investigated the relationship between board characteristics
and corporate performance of firms in Palestine. The degree to which the
board is effective in performing its duties and tasks depends on several
factors manifested by certain characteristics. Particularly, this research
examined the impact of CEO duality, board size, board independence,
board gender diversity, board academic background, and frequency of
board meetings on the level of corporate performance. The sample
encompassed all firms listed in the Palestine Stock Exchange (PSE) with
available data for the years 2012 to 2014 with total 141 firm-year
observations. The data was manually collected from the audited annual
reports downloaded from PSE website. Generalized least square estimators
were obtained for the multiple-linear relationship between board
characteristics and firm performance. The results indicate that corporate
performance of Palestinian listed firms is positively related to board
duality, board gender diversity, and number of board meetings.
Meanwhile, board size, board independence and board academic
background seem to negatively affect performance. The results are
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consistent with the stewardship theory where the board plays a supportive
role by empowering executives leading to, potentially, higher
performance. In this context decisions are executed faster, the ambiguity
between the processes and the objectives of the firm is reduced and
performance is enhanced. Our results have an implication to any future
corporate governance code setting. The stewardship theory not the agency
theory should guide the lawmakers in constructing any new legislation
related to corporate governance.
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Board Characteristics, Palestinian
Corporations.
ملخص
تهدف هذه الدراسة الى اختبار العالقة بين خصائص مجلس االدارة وبين اداء الشركات في
فلسطين ،ان كفاءة مجلس االدارة في اداء مهامه تعتمد على العديد من العوامل ومنها خصائص
مجلس االدارة ،وقد حقق هذا البحث هدفه من خالل اختبار أثر العوامل التالية على أداء الشركة:
ازدواجية الدور الذي يمارسه رئيس مجلس االدارة بحيث يكون هو المدير العام ايضا ،حجم (عدد
اعضاء) مجلس االدارة ،استقاللية اعضاء مجلس االدارة ،التنوع في مجلس االدارة ،الخلفية
االكاديمية ألعضاء مجلس االدارة ،وعدد االجتماعات التي يعقدها المجلس خالل العام ،الختبار
العالقات السابقة تم استخدام بيانات زمنية-مقطعية من سنة  2012وحتى  2014لكافة الشركات
المدرجة في بورصة فلسطين والتي تتوافر البيانات المطلوبة لها خالل تلك الفترة ،كافة البيانات
المستخدمة تم الحصول عليها يدويا من التقارير السنوية المدققة للشركات كما هي متوفرة على
موقع سوق فلسطين لالوراق المالية ،تم تقدير معامالت االنحدار باستخدام طريقة المربعات
الصغرى العامة ( ،)GLSوقد أظهرت النتائج ان أداء الشركات الفلسطينية يتأثر سلبا بحجم مجلس
االدارة وباستقاللية أعضائه وبعدد حملة الدكتوراة فيه ،ولكن ظهر وجود عالقة موجبة بين
ازدواجية دور رئيس مجلس االدارة والمدير العام وبين األداء ،مما يتوافق مع نظرية االشراف
التي تفسر حقيقة انه عندما يكون رئيس مجلس االدارة هو نفسه المدير العام فإن القرارات ستنفذ
بشكل اسرع ،والغموض في العمليات واالهداف للشركة ستكون اقل ،واألداء سيكون افضل ،كما
اظهرت النتائج عالقة ايجابية قوية بين نسبة النساء في عضوية مجلس االدارة وأداء الشركة،
أخيرا فإن عدد االجتماعات التي يعقدها مجلس االدارة كان له اثر ايجابي ايضا على اداء الشركة،
وتتالءم النتائج بشكل عام مع نظرية االشراف مما يعني ان اي قانون للحوكمة يتم تبنيه في فلسطين
يجب ان يأخذ ذلك بعين االعتبار.
الكلمات المفتاحية :حوكمة الشركات ،خصائص مجلس االدارة ،الشركات الفلسطينية

ـــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــ An - Najah Univ. J. Res. (Humanities). Vol. 34(4), 2020

2

https://digitalcommons.aaru.edu.jo/anujr_b/vol34/iss4/6

Abdeljawad and Masri: Board Characteristics and Corporate Performance: Evidence from Pa

Islam Abdeljawad & Rasha Masri  ــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــ747

Introduction
Corporate governance has been a focus of enormous economic studies.
The spreading of global financial crises and scandals has brought to light
corporate governance concerns both in developed and developing
countries. Regulators, policy makers, financial institutions, investors and
other stakeholders became more aware of the firm’s need to have strong
and sound corporate governance framework which provide a legal
platform and guidelines that secure the interests of investors and improve
corporate performance (Ponnu, 2008).
Corporate governance practices are therefore intended to suggest
solutions to the problems allied with the split-up between ownership and
management of the organization. Good corporate governance intends to
protect the overall interests of stockholders and supports the level of trust
for investors. Weak and unsophisticated corporate governance does not
lead merely to corporate underperformance and unattractive investment
environment, but also leads to macroeconomic crises (Johnson et al.,
2000). The growing importance of corporate governance was pursuit by
the integration and deregulation of capital markets, the wave of
privatization, the reforming of pension funds and private savings, the
takeover waves, and the world-wild corporate scandals (Becht et al.,
2002).
Good corporate governance manifests itself in the effectiveness of the
board of directors and the management of the corporation. The board of
directors is responsible for mitigating self-interest activities as well as
reducing losses caused by sub-optimal decisions by executives (Fama &
Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The board effectiveness remains
hard to understand and define, as there is major debate about the roles and
tasks that should be assigned to the board. The board effectiveness
dimensions include searching the environment for threats and
opportunities provide guidance and feedback to the CEO; and, draw out a
network of contacts and sources of knowledge to strengthen firm
performance (Lawler et al., 2002). This is a broader definition than the
traditional board effectiveness in monitoring and controlling managers. In
addition, board responsibilities lie in directing the CEO and top
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management on strategic issues, and facilitating the attainment of
resources important for the firm’s success, as well as mitigating agency
costs (Johnson et al., 1996).
The degree to which the board would be effective in performing its
duties and tasks depends on several factors, which may be made up of
particular board characteristics like board duality, CEO duality, board size,
board diversity, and board skills among others (Peng et al., 2007; Daily &
Dalton, 1997; Silva et al., 2006; Carter et al., 2003).
Palestine is a small economy but increasingly adopting the concepts
of good corporate governance. There is increased interest in promoting
corporate governance guidelines by governmental institutions, civil
society organizations, and business sectors because of the increased
awareness about the importance of governance in creating an attractive
investment environment that is able to attract domestic and external
investments, therefore, achieving higher rates of economic growth,
decreasing unemployment, poverty and external support dependency
(Abdelkarim, 2016; Hassan, Naser & Hijazi, 2016).
In spite of the growing awareness of the importance of corporate
governance, little empirical research exists to determine the relationship
between board characteristics and corporate performance of firms in
Palestine with few studies discussed the relationship between governance
and performance (Abdelkarim, 2016; Abdelkarim & Alawneh, 2009;
Hassan, Naser & Hijazi, 2016). A study of board-performance association
in Palestine is crucial to add to our knowledge about this relationship from
a unique, small and relatively closed economy of Palestine. What
characteristics make one board relatively more effective than other boards?
This research was set to answer this question by examining the impact of
CEO duality, board size, board independence, board diversity, board skills
and frequency of board meetings on the level of corporate performance.
The remaining of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we
reviewed the theoretical and empirical literature. In Section 3, we
developed the hypotheses. In Section 4, the data and methodology are
presented. In Section 5, the results are discussed and Section 6 concluded.
An - Najah Univ. J. Res. (Humanities). Vol. 34(4), 2020 ـــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــ

https://digitalcommons.aaru.edu.jo/anujr_b/vol34/iss4/6

4

Abdeljawad and Masri: Board Characteristics and Corporate Performance: Evidence from Pa

Islam Abdeljawad & Rasha Masri  ــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــ749

Literature Review
From a theoretical point of view, corporate governance is often
analyzed using agency theory, stewardship theory, resource-dependence
theory, and stakeholder theory. In agency theory the goal of the agent is
different from that of the principals, and they may conflict (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976) hence, board tends to exercise strict control, supervision,
and monitoring on the performance of the agent in order to protect the
interests of the principals (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). In stewardship
theory, executives of a company are stewards of the owners, and both
groups share common goals (Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997). The
board should play a supportive role by empowering executives and, in turn,
increase the potential for higher performance (Shen, 2003). Resourcedependence theory argues that a board exists as a provider of resources to
executives in order to help them achieve organizational goals (Hillman,
Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000). Resource-dependence theory recommends
interventions by the board while advocating for strong financial, human,
and intangible supports to the executives. Finally, stakeholder theory
assumes that shareholders are not the only group with a stake in a firm.
Others can be affected by the success or failure of the firm. Therefore,
managers have special obligations to ensure that all stakeholders (not just
the shareholders) receive a fair return from their stake in the company
(Donaldson & Preston, 1995). In this context, the board has a
responsibility to be the guardian of the interests of all stakeholders by
ensuring that corporate or organizational practices take into account the
principles of sustainability for surrounding communities.
Empirical evidence is voluminous but the results are mixed. (Beiner et
al., 2006) discussed whether ‘good’ corporate governance has a positive
impact on firm valuation of Swiss firms and found supports to the
hypothesis of a positive relationship between firm-specific corporate
governance index and Tobin’s Q. (Arora & Bodhanwala, 2018) examine
the relationship between a corporate governance index and firm
performance in India. The study reveals significant positive relationship
between governance and firm performance. (Johl, Kaur, & Cooper, 2015)
study the relationship between board characteristics and firm performance.
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The findings suggest that larger board size, less frequent board meetings
and a higher percentage of board members with accounting expertise have
a positive implication on firm performance. However, board independence
does not affect firm performance according to this study.
Arslan, Karan, and Eksi (2010) analyzed the impact of board structure
attributes on accounting and stock market performance of firms in Turkey
in both general and crisis periods. They found that duality of CEO and the
chairman of the board has no impact on corporate performance in general
period although it has negative impact during the crisis period. Moreover,
board independence is found to have no effect on accounting performance,
yet the stock market perceives board independence positively, both in
general and in the crisis periods. Finally, board size has a positive impact,
both on the accounting and on the stock market performance of firms, yet
the impact reverts to negative during the crisis period.
Mishra and Kapil (2018) explored the relationship of board
characteristics and firm performance for Indian companies. Market-based
measure (Tobin’s Q) and accounting-based measure (return on asset) have
been employed for measuring firm performance. Findings indicate that
there is significant positive association between board size, board
independence, number of board meetings, and separation of CEO and
chairman of the board from one side and firm performance from the other.
Overburdened directors affect firm performance adversely. Findings also
suggest that the governance-performance relationship is also dependent
upon the type of performance measures used in the study whether
accounting or market measures. Zhou, Owusu-Ansah, and Maggina (2018)
investigated whether the characteristics of board of directors and audit
committees are associated with firm performance in the Athens Stock
Exchange and find that firms having large-sized boards performed better,
but firms having more independent board members performed poorly.
Moreover, firms with small-sized boards and those with boards having
more independent members are more likely to form audit committees, but
no association between audit committee characteristics and firm
performance. These findings suggest that boards of Greek firms take more
active role in advising than monitoring. Petchsakulwong and Jansakul
An - Najah Univ. J. Res. (Humanities). Vol. 34(4), 2020 ـــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــ
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(2017) investigated the impact of board of directors' characteristics on the
profitability ratio of Thai public non-life insurers measured by return on
total assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and return on net written
premiums (RNP). The findings revealed positive relationship between
board size and the profitability ratio. On the contrary, board meeting
frequency was negatively related with ROA and RNP. In addition, firm
size was negatively related with the profitability ratio.
In Palestine, a national committee for corporate governance has issued
the first Corporate Governance Code in 2009. Though the code lacks the
enforceability, most firms adopted it by the encouragement of the stock
exchange and the Capital Market Authority. For banks, the Palestine
Monetary Authority has also issued the Corporate Governance Guide for
Banks in Palestine in 2014. How these codes affect the performance of
firms is largely unknown. Only few papers addressed the relationship
between corporate governance and performance in Palestine. Abdelkarim
and Alawneh (2009) investigated the relationship between ownership
concentration, as a proxy for governance, and firm performance as
measured by Tobin’s Q on a sample of 16 Palestinian companies from
2003 to 2006 and found that the two variables are negatively related.
Abdelkarim and Ijbara (2010) examined the Palestinian non-banking
listed-firms compliance to corporate governance using self-administered
questionnaire survey. They do not find satisfactory compliance of
Palestinian firms with the corporate governance best practices with respect
to board composition and independence. They explain this noncompliance by the non-enforceability of the corporate governance code,
the outdated companies’ law, which is issued in 1963 and to the family
ownership dominance over corporations. Abdelkarim (2016) found no
relationship between firm performance and the degree of governance
compliance using a sample of 28 Palestinian firms listed in 2009. They
measure performance by the change in return on investment between year
2008 and the average return of the next 6 years. However, these papers can
be criticized on the basis of measurement of variables, estimation methods,
and sample size. Hassan et al. (2016) explored the relationship between
corporate performance and corporate governance at Palestine Exchange
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during the period from 2010-2012 using a sample of 30 non-financial
firms. Accounting and market performance measures, namely ROA, ROE,
and Tobin’s Q were used to proxy corporate performance. Corporate
governance represented by the board of directors' size, the frequency of
the annual meetings of the board, existence of an audit committee,
institutional investors’ ownership and foreign ownership. They found that
corporate governance variables are negatively associated with the financial
performance which is in the contrary to the main stream literature.
Hypotheses development
The board effectiveness stays hard to understand and define. Empirical
research highlights several factors that determine the degree the board
would be effective in performing its duties and tasks. These factors are
made up of particular board characteristics like CEO duality, board size,
board diversity, board skills, board independence and frequency of board
meetings. Following are discussions of these factors.
CEO Duality
The CEO duality can be considered as a control structure that
combines the position of board chair and CEO. CEO duality can prevent
board’s ability to keep track of management and weaken board monitoring
effectiveness (Fama & Jensen, 1983), meaning that agency problems are
higher when the same person occupies the two positions. According to this
view, the separation of board chair and CEO positions can improve firm
performance. Whereas the stewardship theory argues that when the same
person implements both roles this may improve the firm’s performance, as
internal and external ambiguity concerning the responsibility for firm
objectives and processes may be removed (Finkelstein & D’Alene, 1994).
Many empirical studies in emerging and less developed economies found
that CEO duality may promote firm performance (Peng et al., 2007). Other
studies found no significant difference between firms that separate
between board and management and those with CEO duality (Daily &
Dalton, 1997). In view of this discussion, the following hypothesis will be
articulated.
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H1: There is a positive relationship between CEO duality and firm
performance.
Board Size
The board size is used as an indicator of both advisory and monitoring
roles (Klein, 1998). The board size increases with firm size and firm age
(Coles et al., 2008). Research on optimal board size led to no definite
results. Large board size increases cost, as the coordination,
communication, and efficient and effective decision making is costlier and
harder, while small board size do not monitor managers effectively and
can be directed by CEO.
Many studies investigate the board size effect on performance.
Yermack (1996) investigate the association between board size and firm
performance measured by Tobin’s Q and found significant negative
relationship. This research reveals that firms with small board are more
capable to use their assets effectively and have higher profits than large
board firms. Eisenberg et al. (1998) find a similar negative relationship
between board size and firm performance as measured by return on assets.
We will hypothesize the following
H2: Board size is negatively related to firm performance.
Board Independence
The board may comprise executive and non-executive members. The
non-executive directors play a vital role in monitoring the actions of the
CEO and executive directors to ensure that the shareholders’ interests are
well cared for and to add to the diversity of skills and expertise of the
directors (Weir & Laing, 2001). Consistent with this argument, Awan
(2012) found a positive relationship between non-executives and firm
performance measured by return on asset (ROA) and return on equity
(ROE) in Pakistan. Dehaene, Vuyst, and Ooghe (2001) found similar
relationship in Belgian companies which supports the notion that outsiders
are able to perform a monitoring function as a result of their independence.
Some studies expect a contrary result. Weir and Liang (2001) argued
that non-executive directors are only employed on a part-time basis and
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are therefore likely to have other work commitments, may lack the
expertise necessary for understanding highly technical business issues and
may have insufficient information when required to make key decisions.
Some studies found no relationship between independence and
performance. A study conducted by Abdullah (2004) in Malaysia found
that there is no significant difference in performance between firms with
independent boards and firms with non-independent boards. They explain
that in many developing countries, the selection of the independent
directors is not based on their expertise and qualifications but more for
political reasons and personal connections to legitimate business activities
and contracts. The latter two arguments are similar to the case of Palestine.
Therefore, this study proposes the following hypothesis:
H3: There is a negative relationship between board independence and
firm performance.
Gender Diversity
Traditionally boards are composed of only male members. The
presence of female on board leads to gender diversity. Largely, diversity
is expected to enhance organizational value and performance as it provides
new perspectives and insights (Carter et al., 2003). The influence of board
diversity, mostly gender diversity, on firm performance has been studied
widely. Erhardt et al. (2003) found that the percentage of women on board
positively connected with return on investment and return on assets
(ROA). Carter et al. (2003) found that the relationship between Tobin’s Q
and the proportion of women on the board was positive. The impact of
female directors on firm performance of selected US firms tends to find
that female board members assign more effort to monitoring (Adams &
Ferreira, 2009). However, Shrader et al. (1997) did not find any significant
relationship in a sample of top US firms, between percentage of women on
board and financial performance. Bohren and Strom (2005) reported a
significant negative relationship between the proportion of women on the
board and Tobin’s Q of Norwegian firms. Our hypothesis is the following:
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H4: The percentage of women on firm’s board is positively related to
firm performance.
Academic background
Board of directors constitutes an important resource for the
corporation. Consequently, higher degree of educational credential like
PhD will represent an additional wealth to the firm (Carpenter & Westphal,
2001). Since many PhD holders are from academia, Francis, Hasan and
Wu (2015) find that firms with directors from academia are associated with
higher performance. In Francis et al., study, the presence of academic
directors is associated with higher number of patents and citations, higher
stock price informativeness, lower discretionary accruals, lower chief
executive officer (CEO) compensation, and higher CEO forced turnover‐
performance sensitivity. Overall, academic directors are valuable advisors
and effective monitors and firms are expected to benefit from having them
on board. The hypothesis related to board academic background is the
following:
H5: The percentage of directors with PhD qualifications and firm
Performance are positively associated.
Board Meetings
Board meetings are an important channel through which directors
obtain firm specific information and able to fulfill their monitoring role
(Adam & Ferreira, 2009). Francis et al. (2012) found that firms with poor
board attendance at meetings perform lower than boards which have good
attendance during financial crisis. Ntim and Osei (2011) in South Africa
found that boards that meet more frequently tend to generate higher
financial performance.
On the other hand, some researchers argue that board meetings not
necessarily useful since frequent meetings involve managerial time,
increase travel expenses, administrative support requirements, and
directors’ meeting fees. This may affect enterprise activities within the
firm as resources are being channeled towards less productive activities
(Evans, Evans & Loh, 2002). Our hypothesis is the following:
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H6: The firm performance is expected to be enhanced by more frequent
board meetings.
Research methodology
Data
This study examined the impact of board characteristics on firm
performance using balanced panel data from Palestinian listed firms. The
sample for this research is composed of 141 firm-year observations from
all available firms listed in the PSE during the years 2012 to 2014 subject
to the availability of data. The data was manually collected from the
audited annual reports published on the website of PSE. Table 1 presents
the distribution of the data by year and by sector.
Table (1): Sample of the study by sector and year
Sector
Banking and Financial Services Sector
Industry Sector
Insurance Sector
Investment Sector
Service Sector
Total

2012
7
13
7
9
11
47

2013
7
13
7
9
11
47

2014
7
13
7
9
11
47

Total
21
39
21
27
33
141

Variables measurement
The independent variables for this study include CEO duality, board
size, board independence, board gender, board academic background, and
board meetings. All these variables are theoretically discussed in Section
3. The measurement of these variables is presented in Table 2 along with
control and dependent variables which are discussed following.
Corporate Performance
Accounting performance measurement is used in this research since
capital market in Palestine is not developed and tends to be volatile for
reasons other than economic performance. Financial measures such as
return on equity (ROE), return on asset (ROA) and earning per share (EPS)
provide the direct and relevant focus for improving performance, since
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measuring and rewarding activities that enhance financial performance is
thought to best improve shareholders’ wealth. Therefore, this research
employs the ROE, EPS and ROA as indicators of management
performance. According to agency theory, managers may waste or
misspend profits and earnings, and leave less return for shareholders hence
lower ROE and EPS while return on asset (ROA) is directly related to
management’s ability to use assets efficiently.
Firm Size
Large firms have more potential and capacity to generate funds, avoid
financial constraints, and provide financing for profitable projects
(Majumdar, 1997). We expect a positive relationship between firm size
and firm performance.
Leverage
Leverage may proxy for financial distress hence a negative
relationship is expected with performance. However, levered firms may
have an additional incentive to generate higher level of cash flows to pay
interest and principal to creditors hence positively relate to performance.
We will use leverage as one of the control variables following Short and
Keasey (1999); Abor (2005); and Bhagat and Bolton (2008).
Table (2): Measurement of variables.
Variable
Abbreviation
Measurement
1. Board characteristics (independent variables)
CEO duality Duality
Dummy variable takes value of 1 if
the CEO is a board chair, otherwise 0.
Board size
B Size
Number of directors on board.
Board
Independence Percentage of independent directors
independence
on board
Gender
Gender
Percentage of women directors on
diversity
board.
Academic
Academic
Percentage of board members with
Background
PhD qualification.
Board
B Meetings
Number of board meetings held
meetings
during the year
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… continue table (2)

Variable
Abbreviation
Measurement
2. Firm performance (dependent variable proxies)
Return on
ROE
Net income divided by total equity
Equity
Return on
ROA
Net income divided by total assets.
Assets
Earnings per EPS
Net Income divided by the number of
Share
shares outstanding.
3. Control variables
Firm size
F Size
Logarithm of the firm’s total assets in
US Dollars (firms data in Jordan
Dinar is converted in USD using the
official average exchange rate)
Firm
Leverage
Percentage of total liability to total
leverage
assets
Model
The independent variables of this research include CEO duality, board
size, board independence, board gender, academic background and board
meetings. Moreover, firm size and firm leverage are used as control
variables. The dependent variable of performance was proxied by three
alternatives ROE, ROA and EPS. Based on our hypotheses, we proposed
the following linear model to be estimated.
Performanceit = B0 + B1 (Duality)it + B2 (B Size)it + B3
(Independence)it + B4 (Gender)it + B5 (Academic)it + B6 (B meetings)it +
B7 (F Size)it + B8 (Leverage)it + eit
where performance is the dependent variable, Bis are the regression
coefficients, independent and control variables within brackets are as
discussed in Table 2, eit is the error term and i and t subscripts are firm and
year indicators. The model has been estimated using Generalized Least
Square method (GLS) to account for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation problems appeared in the diagnostic process.
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Results
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive analysis for the dependent and independent variables of
the research are presented in Table 3. For CEO duality, in 81% of the firms,
the CEO and Chairman positions are held by different individuals. Only
19% of the sample firms have a dual leadership structure. The average
board size of firms in Palestine is about 9 members ranging from 5 to 15
members. Concerning board independence, the average percentage of
independent members is 92%. Most board members do not have any
position in the firm.
The average percentage of women board membership is 5% of board
size while the median is almost zero. This result is disturbing when
compared to the increasing number of women participating on firm boards
of other developed and developing economies. Concerning the percentage
of PhD holders on board of Palestinian firms, the results indicate that the
average number of PhD holders on corporate board is 15 percent of board
size. This result is eye-catching considering the competences, capabilities
and qualifications of the board. The average number of meetings is about
6 meetings per year. However, the data of this variable is missing for a
considerable number of firms. For this reason, we will estimate our models
twice, one with board meeting variable and the other without this variable.
The average ROE, ROA and EPS are 1%, 1% and 0.11 Dollars
respectively. However, the median which is not affected by extreme values
is 2%, 4% and 0.06 Dollars respectively.
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Table (3): Descriptive statistics for all variables

Correlation analysis
Table 4 represents the correlation matrix between independent
variables. Most of the correlation coefficients are relatively small
indicating no serious multicollinearity problem existing between
independent variables. Firm size has high positive correlations with
leverage (54%) and board size (46%). However, these correlations do not
indicate multicollinearity problem according to Asteriou and Hall (2007).
Table (4): Correlation Matrix between independent variables

Model Estimation
This section presents the results of the model estimation. The model is
estimated for the three proxies of performance ROE, ROA and EPS
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separately. For robustness, two specifications with each performance
proxy are considered, one with the board meeting variable and the other
without the board meeting variable. Board meetings variable subjects to
many missing observations and including it in the regression will result in
high loss in information. Of course, the findings of the relationships
between variables are more reliable if they are qualitatively equivalent
between the two specifications with each dependent variable. Whenever
the results of the two specifications are not the same, we consider the
model with more observations to be more robust. Table (5) presents the
regression results. F-statistics are significant for all models and R-square
ranges from 40% to 67%.
CEO duality and ROE are positively related consistent with our
hypothesis. The coefficient of the duality variable was positive and
significant in promoting the financial performance of firms in Palestine
according to Model 1 consistent with stewardship theory and with the
findings of many research papers that firms with CEO duality outperform
firms that separate the two positions (Peng et al., 2007). Positive
relationship between CEO duality and firm performance may be explained
by the fact that when the chairman is the same person as the CEO,
decisions are executed faster. Moreover, the chairman (CEO) will be more
aware of the decisions needed to be taken to improve performance and
reducing the ambiguity of the processes and the objectives of the firm.
However, the relationship with EPS is negative in Model 4 consistent with
the agency theory which posits that the separation of the CEO and the
chairman positions will enhance firm performance and monitoring
effectiveness. The relationship is insignificant for other models. Overall,
the evidence related to CEO duality is not conclusive.
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Table (5): Estimation results for ROE, EPS and ROA as the dependent
variables.

***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Numbers in
parenthesis are t-statistics. Panel EGLS estimation with cross section weights is used for
the estimation of the following model
Performanceit = B0 +B1 (Duality)it + B2 (B Size)it + B3 (Independence)it + B4
(Gender)it + B5(Academic)it + B6(B meetings)it +B7(F Size)it +B8(Leverage)it + eit

For board size, the coefficient is negative and significant for all models
with ROE and EPS. Large size boards have a negative effect on
performance. Large board size seems to increase cost of coordination,
communication, and reduces efficiency of decision making. This result is
similar to Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg et al. (1998) and is consistent
with stewardship theory and also resource based theory.
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The coefficient of board independence is negative with all
performance proxies but becomes insignificant once the regression lose
observation as a result of including board meetings variable. External
board members may lack knowledge, information, or time for controlling
and decision making (Weir & Laing, 2001). Therefore, the involvement of
independent directors has a negative effect on performance consistent with
stewardship theory.
Surprisingly, a positive and robust relationship between the percentage
of women on board and firm performance is found. This result is consistent
with the findings of Adams and Ferreira (2009); Carter et al. (2003); and
Bonn (2004). This result is explained by diversity that enhances
organizational value and performance as it provides new perspectives and
insights to the firm as expected by the stewardship theory and resourcebased theory.
Though we expect a positive relationship between the number of
directors with PhD qualification and firm performance, the regression
results show a negative effect for this variable on corporate performance
for all models though vary with significance. This result is confusing since
it is inconsistent with any existing theory. We may explain this result as
PhD holders are invited to boards for prestigious reasons and they usually
accept this role. The real power remains in the hands of the block
stockholders who are mostly family members or group of investors. In this
scenario, the existence of PhD holders becomes a burden not an asset for
the firm governance and performance.
The effect of the frequency of board meetings is positive indicating
the more frequent the board met, the higher the performance of the firm.
Board members are likely to obtain more information about the firm and
fulfill their monitoring role via the board meetings. This result is similar
to Adams and Ferreira (2009); Francis et al. (2012); and Ntim and Osei
(2011).
Firm size and leverage were used to control the relationship between
board characteristics and firm performance. A positive and robust
relationship was found between firm size and performance. The positive
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relationship with size is consistent with the literature as larger firms are
likely to improve corporate performance since economies of scale and
scope are more emphasized, and knowledge and experience are enhanced
(Majumdar, 1997). The negative and robust relationship found between
leverage and firm performance is consistent with the proposition that
leverage proxy for financial distress. This result is consistent with the
results of Short and Keasey (1999); Abor (2005); and Bhagat and Bolton
(2008).
Conclusion
Board of directors is the essential corporate governance tool. Boards
are responsible for the corporation they rule. Consequently, corporate
governance codes, regulations and recommendations are concentrating on
enhancing the board’s effectiveness in order to increase corporate
governance. In spite of the fact that boards of directors are assumed to be
vital for the success and survival of firms, there is still quite little known
about the way boards function in the small economy of Palestine. Board
characteristics research has been influenced by agency theory, resource
dependency theory, stakeholder theory and stewardship theory. This study
investigated the effect of board characteristics of Palestinian firms on firm
performance using panel data manually collected from the annual reports
of all firms listed at the stock exchange from 2012 to 2014.
The results indicate that corporate performance of Palestinian listed
firms is negatively related to board size, board independence and board
academic background. However, a highly significant positive relationship
between performance from one side and gender diversity and frequency of
board meetings from the other are found. The relationship between board
duality and firm performance is inconclusive but the positive effect is more
reliable since it is based on larger sample. The positive relationship is
consistent with the fact that when the chairman is the same person as the
CEO decisions are executed faster, the ambiguity between the processes
and the objectives of the firm is reduced and performance is enhanced.
The overall results are consistent with the stewardship theory. This
may result from the ownership structure of firms in Palestine. Block
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stockholders in Palestine are usually group of investors or family members
who assign one of the family or the group as a CEO and support him to
achieve the goals of the family or the group. The role of board is supporting
rather than controlling the executives in this framework.
This finding implies that in any future governance code, the
stewardship theory not the agency theory should guide the lawmakers or
legislators. Code governance in Palestine should not discourage CEO
duality. On the other hand, the code should encourage smaller board size,
gender diversity and more frequent board meetings. Board independence
and academic background should be dealt with carefully. Governance code
and policies should establish a real independence instead of existing face
independence (i.e. governance code may call for cumulative voting to
reduce the power of block stockholders). In this case independent
members, whether academic or not, will have the power to control and
supervise.
Finally, the positive and highly significant relationship between
percentage of female on board and performance is an interesting result and
needs further research to determine the reasons behind it in the Palestinian
environment. Whether diversity of expertise is the reason or there are other
reasons is an open question left for future research.
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